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Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics 
 
Some metaethical arguments claim to undermine the good-standing of morality. Examples 
include arguments for moral scepticism or for an error theory of moral judgment. An 
increasingly popular way of responding to these arguments is to show that they over-reach: 
they undermine the good-standing of some non-moral subject matter in a costly or 
implausible fashion. One might show, for example, that arguments for moral scepticism 
entail mathematical scepticism. Or one might show that arguments for the moral error theory 
entail an error theory about epistemic judgment. To the extent that these consequences are 
costly or implausible, the metaethical arguments have over-reached. So we should reject 
them.  
 
This is the companions in guilt strategy (CIG) in metaethics. There has been a great deal of 
recent work on its use, particularly in response to the new wave of moral error theories. In 
this article I provide an opinionated guide to some of it. I begin (section 1) by detailing the 
strategy and providing criteria for assessing specific instances of it. I then assess two kinds of 
CIG strategy. Firstly (sections 2-4), I assess those that take non-moral, normative judgments 
– epistemic, prudential and aesthetic judgments - as a companion. Secondly (section 5), I 
assess those that take mathematical judgment as a companion.  
 
1. Methodology of CIG Arguments 
 
I begin with some methodological remarks about how CIG arguments should be 
characterised and assessed, and why we should care about them. 
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1.1 Characterizing CIG Arguments 
 
We can usefully distinguish between two types of CIG argument: by analogy and by 
entailment (Lillehammer 2007). 
 
Analogy-based arguments work by drawing an analogy between moral judgment and some 
non-moral judgment type. Consider an example. Moral judgment is the subject of widespread 
disagreement. Suppose that this leads some philosopher to conclude that there are no moral 
facts. This conclusion is an obvious target of a CIG argument by analogy. Many non-moral 
judgment-types are also the subject of widespread disagreement, for example, religious 
judgments. So if widespread moral disagreement warrants denial of moral facts, then it surely 
warrants denial of facts about religious matters too. But the consequent of this conditional is 
independently costly or implausible (God either exists or does not). So we should reject its 
antecedent too.  
 
There are other ways in which metaethical arguments can over-reach. It is sometimes 
claimed, for example, that ordinary scientific practice presupposes that there are moral facts 
(Putnam 2002).i If this is true, then arguments for the moral error theory would undermine 
the good-standing of ordinary scientific practice. This is plausibly an over-reach too. Yet it is 
not based on any analogy between moral judgments and scientific judgments. Rather, it is 
based on a non-analogical dependence relation between moral judgment and its companion. 
Arguments that take this form are CIG arguments by entailment. 
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My focus will be on CIG arguments by analogy, though I note that (a) there are important 
CIG arguments by entailment, and (b) there are important CIG arguments that are a hybrid of 
entailment and analogy.ii  
 
1.2 Assessing CIG Arguments 
 
There are two basic questions that we need to bear in mind when assessing the effectiveness 
of a specific CIG argument.  
 
i. The Companionship Question  
 
Is the proposed ‘companion’ for moral judgment really a companion? The answer is ‘yes’ if 
and only if the problematic feature of moral judgment that motivates the error theoretic or 
sceptical argument (e.g. being the subject of widespread disagreement)  is shared by the non-
moral companion.   
 
ii. The Costliness Question 
 
How costly or implausible it would be, should the good-standing of the companion be 
undermined? The greater the cost, the stronger the argument. A CIG argument that entails 
that, for example, nothing exists, or that we know nothing of the external world is stronger 
than a CIG argument that entails a less drastic, or counter-intuitive conclusion.  
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The answers to these questions determine whether the CIG argument is a good one. This can 
be a matter of degree, and a matter of controversy. I illustrate this using specific examples 
below. 
 
1.3 What’s the Attraction of CIG Arguments 
 
Why would one argue via the CIG strategy rather than take a more direct approach to 
rebutting challenges to the moral error theory, moral scepticism or to the good-standing of 
moral judgment more generally? 
 
The most obvious reason is that the CIG strategy is dialectically very strong. It does not 
directly contest the specific premises of the metaethical argument against which it is targeted. 
Rather, it teases out the non-moral consequences of that argument; consequences that all 
parties can assess independently of their metaethical commitments.  
 
Secondly, the CIG strategy gives us some stable ground from which to assess views in 
metaethics. Often arguments in metaethics are extremely complex. Assessing them can be 
very difficult and the rules of the game are not always clear. The CIG strategy promises some 
stable ground. If we see, for example, that sceptical arguments in metaethics generalize to 
mathematics, or logic, or epistemology, we have an obvious reason to treat them with 
suspicion. 
 
CIG strategies also have weaknesses. Firstly, they don’t provide a positive account of moral 
metaphysics or epistemology. They merely show that some philosophical arguments for (e.g.) 
sceptical or error-theoretic views fail. Secondly, even if they succeed in showing that these 
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arguments fail, they fail to show why or where they fail. Thirdly, CIG arguments can be read 
as modus tollens or modus ponens. Suppose that one offers a CIG argument against the moral 
error theory by arguing that if it is true, then a mathematical error theory is true too. A 
sufficiently stubborn moral error theorist may simply take this as a good reason to be a 
mathematical error theorist.  
 
2. The Epistemic Analogy against Moral Error Theory 
 
There are many CIG arguments, developing different candidate companions in response to 
different metaethical arguments (Lillehammer 2007). A survey is beyond the scope of the 
present article. I focus on those CIG arguments that have figured prominently in the recent 
literature, beginning with those that have been used in combatting the new wave of moral 
error theorists. These arguments have tended to focus on non-moral, normative judgments as 
companions. The most high-profile example focuses on epistemic judgment. This strategy 
was influentially stated by Terence Cuneo as part of his (2007) book The Normative Web. It 
has since been the subject of much scrutiny.iii The details of the argument depend on how, 
exactly, the argument for the moral error theory is formulated. There are two primary 
formulations. 
 
According to the first formulation moral judgers are committed to the existence of 
categorical, normative reasons (Joyce 2001, 2006, 2011). Categorical reasons are reasons that 
one possesses whatever one’s desires. If, for example, I judge that I morally ought not to kill 
the innocent, then, plausibly whatever I desire, I am committed to the existence of some 
reason not to kill the innocent. Furthermore, these reasons are genuinely normative or 
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binding. In this they are unlike the merely ‘institutional’ or ‘norm-relative’ reasons for 
compliance generated by the rules of (e.g.) sports, games and etiquette. 
 
Epistemic judgers seem equally likely to possess these commitments. When one judges that it 
would be justifiable to believe a proposition in light of one’s evidence, one is plausibly 
thereby committed to that evidence constituting a reason to believe that proposition whatever 
one’s desires. So epistemic judgers are committed to categorical reasons. These reasons are 
often thought to be genuinely normative or binding too (Cuneo 2007, Bedke 2010, Rowland 
2013, 2016, Das 2016, 2017). Putting these two thoughts together, we get: 
 
(A) If moral judgers are committed to categorical, genuinely normative reasons, then so 
are epistemic judgers. 
 
It would follow that ‘categoricity-based’ arguments for the moral error theory would 
generalize to an epistemic error theory. 
 
It is, however, increasingly popular to formulate the moral error theory in slightly different 
terms: in terms of the commitments of moral judgers to the existence of irreducibly 
normative relations (Olson 2014, Streumer 2017). These are normative relations (such as the 
reason-relation or favouring-relation) that cannot be reductively identified with non-
normative relations. Why think that moral judgers are committed to such things? One simple 
reason is that the most obvious reductions of normative relations are to either (a) desire-
promotion relations, or (b) that of being prescribed by some purely conventional system of 
norms (Olson 2014).iv Yet, as noted above, neither of these seem plausible for either the 
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moral or epistemic domains. As such, we might think that these ‘irreducibility-based’ 
arguments for the moral error theory also generalise to an epistemic error theory. 
 
Further arguments for the commitment of moral judgers to the existence of irreducibly 
normative relations include the apparent difference in kind between moral relations and non-
normative relations (Parfit 2011, 324), and the behaviour of moral judgment in the context of 
cross-community disagreement (Streumer 2017, 55). Again, it is argued that these apply 
equally in the epistemic domain (Cuneo 2007, Rowland 2013, Das 2016 Streumer 2017). I 
can’t assess these claims in detail here. But if they are correct then: 
 
(B) If moral judgers are committed to irreducibly normative relations, then so are 
epistemic judgers. 
 
When we put (A) and (B) together, epistemic judgments fare well with regard to the 
companionship question. 
 
Epistemic judgments also fare well with respect to the costliness question. This is because the 
consequences of an epistemic error theory are potentially drastic. This point is forcefully 
articulated by Cuneo (2007, Ch. 5). If an epistemic error theory were true, then there would 
be no epistemic reason to believe it or anything else. In addition to this, there would arguably 
be no ‘epistemic merits or demerits’; properties such as justification, understanding, 
foolishness or unreliability. It is arguably a consequence of this that the epistemic error 
theory would entail global scepticism (Rowland 2013). A more contentious claim is that the 
epistemic error theory would entail that there could be no evidential support relations, and 
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hence no valid arguments. This would be the case if and only if evidential support relations 
entailed the existence of normative, epistemic relations. I will return to this below.  
 
3. The Epistemic Analogy Assessed 
 
The argument that we are working with is the following: 
 
1. If the moral error theory is true, then the epistemic error theory is true. 
2. The epistemic error theory is false. 
3. The moral error theory is false (1, 2). 
 
We have seen that both of the premises of this argument are prima facie plausible. But both 
have also been challenged. 
 
3.1 Challenging Premise 1 
 
One might argue that epistemic reasons, unlike moral reasons, are merely institutional: they 
are akin to the reasons generated by sports, games or etiquette. If this is true, then 1 is false, 
at least when applied to categoricity-based arguments for the moral error theory. This way of 
thinking about epistemic reasons is most readily understood within the Quinean tradition of 
understanding epistemology as ‘the technology of truth-seeking’, where this (truth-seeking) is 
an enterprise that, like a sport or game, there is not necessarily any reason to engage in (see 
Quine 1998). The comparison between epistemic reasons and those of sports and games has 
been made explicitly in the recent literature by, amongst others, David Papineau:v  
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“Your best move may be that you ought to move your queen. But [this does not] carry 
genuine prescriptive force. I say the same about epistemic evaluations.” (Papineau 2013, 
69) 
 
This approach to epistemic normativity is naturally paired with a reductive account of 
epistemic reasons. It therefore pressures premise 1 in the context of both categoricity-based 
and irreducibility-based arguments for the moral error theory. The reductive account in 
question identifies epistemic reason-relations with evidential-support relations (Jenkins, 
2007). The evidential-support relation is, in turn, typically identified with the probability-
raising relation.  
 
In order for this to warrant rejection of 1, we would need to show that no analogous reduction 
is available in the moral domain. One important argument for this owes to Chris Heathwood 
(2009). According to Heathwood the identification of epistemic relations with evidential-
support relations passes the open-question argument test, whilst identifications of moral 
relations with non-normative relations does not. It is a closed question, Heathwood thinks, 
whether, given that one proposition is evidence for another, the former is also an epistemic 
reason to believe the latter. Hence, there is no barrier to an analytic identification of epistemic 
relations with non-normative evidential-support relations (analogous to the barrier that Moore 
erected in the moral domain).vi  
 
This poses a real threat to premise 1. But it also faces challenges. One is whether the 
proposed reductive base of epistemic relations is in fact non-normative.vii To see this more 
clearly, focus on a specific proposed reductive analysis of a candidate epistemic property, 
epistemic reasonability: 
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It is reasonable for S to believe that p = It is likely that p is true, given S’s background 
information.viii 
 
There are a number of distinct ways in which normative relations could enter into the 
reductive base.ix Firstly, we can ask how likely p’s truth must be. One obvious response to 
this is in explicitly normative terms: sufficiently likely that it would be permissible for S to 
believe it. If we do this, normative materials have entered into the reductive base. Secondly, 
we can ask how S’s background information should be specified. One candidate here is that 
S’s background information consists in the set of propositions that S is in a position to know, 
or knows, or justifiably believes. Again, one might worry that normative materials have now 
entered into the reductive base.x Thirdly, we can ask what likelihood-raising relations 
themselves actually are. In the above reduction the relevant kind of likelihood is conditional 
epistemic probability (Kelly 2007, Kyriacou and Cuneo, forthcoming). It is plausible that this 
is best understood in terms of the credences of reasonable believers (Plantinga 1993). Again, 
normative materials have now entered into the reductive base.  
 
3.2 Epistemic Error Theory is True 
 
Premise 2 has also been challenged: some moral error theorists simply accept that the 
epistemic error theory is true (Olson 2014, Streumer 2017). Their argument relies on 
distinguishing between normative relations, such as that of being a reason for belief, and 
evidential relations. With this distinction in place, the most implausible consequences of the 
epistemic error theory can be avoided. For example, whilst there will be no reason to believe 
the epistemic error theory, there can still be strong - indeed decisive - evidence for it.  
	 11	
 
This response runs into two main problems. The first is as set-out in 3.1 above. Epistemic 
error theorists rely on a non-normative understanding of evidence. But it is unclear that they 
are entitled to this in a form that would genuinely mitigate the worst of the epistemic error 
theory, given the problems sketched above.  A second problem for the epistemic error 
theorist is to explain the consistency of the epistemic error theory with the nature of belief 
itself. It is often claimed that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, belief stands in a 
constitutive normative relation to truth (Wedgwood 2007, Shah 2011). If so, the epistemic 
error theory is potentially incompatible with any belief-ascriptions. This is because in 
ascribing a belief one is conceptually committed to the instantiation of a normative, epistemic 
relation. 
 
Responses to this challenge vary. One is to deny that the concept of belief is constitutively 
normative. The problem with this is that the existence of a constitutive normative relation 
between belief and truth is often thought to explain otherwise puzzling phenomena in the 
philosophy of mind and language, including the transparency of belief (Shah 2003) and 
Moore-paradoxical sentences.xi A second response is to claim that the normative relations 
entailed by the nature of belief are reducible. In taking this line, one faces the burden of 
providing a plausible reduction (see Olson 2014, 167). A third, more radical response is to 
accept an error theory of belief-ascriptions. The resulting burden is to explain the 
compatibility of this radical response with ordinary views about the nature of thought and 
action. 
 
The above summary is brief and incomplete. Whilst the analogy with epistemic judgment 
certainly pressures the moral error theory, a satisfactory assessment requires resolving 
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difficult questions about the nature of normative reductionism, probability and belief.xii As 
such, this CIG strategy certainly does not provide us with stable ground from which to assess 
the moral error theory. 
 
4.  Alternative Normative Companions: Prudence and Aesthetics 
 
Epistemic judgment is not the only kind of normative judgment. We can also think about 
prudential judgment in this way. Prudential judgments are judgments about what one ought to 
do, or has reason to do, or what it would be good for one to do, from the perspective of one’s 
own wellbeing (as opposed to morality). This can be used to generate a CIG argument. For 
example (Fletcher 2017): 
 
1. If moral error theory is true, then a prudential error theory is true. 
2. Prudential error theory isn’t true. 
3. Moral error theory isn’t true (1, 2). 
  
The first premise is immediately contestable. It is often thought that our prudential reasons 
are dependent on our desires in a sense that our moral reasons are not. This could undermine 
premise 1. Suppose, for example, that I judge that taking up swimming would be good for 
you. Perhaps I am merely committed to the fact that taking up swimming would promote 
some of your desires. If so, then I am arguably committed to neither categorical reasons, nor 
irreducibly normative relations. So 1 is false. 
 
This quick response, however, is problematic. Firstly, desire-satisfaction views of wellbeing 
are not obviously extensionally adequate. Adapted desires in socially and politically unjust 
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environments, uninformed desires, past desires and desires concerning one’s future-self 
provide familiar problems for the extensional adequacy of these views. xiii Secondly, even if a 
desire-satisfaction view is correct, this may not establish a disanalogy that warrants rejection 
of 1. Desire-satisfaction theories are arguably best understood as claiming that desire-
satisfaction properties provide the non-normative subvening base for normative wellbeing 
properties. But if this is correct, then why should we think that there is better prospect for 
reduction of normative wellbeing properties than for reduction of moral properties? It is not 
obvious that we should. After all, moral properties presumably have a descriptive 
supervenience base too. So we would need an additional argument to think that the prospects 
for reducing normative wellbeing properties are superior to those for reducing moral 
properties (additional, that is, to the existence of a supervenience relation between wellbeing 
and desire-satisfaction).  
 
The real challenge for a defender of the analogy with prudential judgment concerns the 
costliness question. Moral error theorists are likely to accept the prudential error theory 
without regarding this as weakening their overall view. This marks a potential point of 
contrast with epistemic judgment. The consequences of an epistemic error theory appear 
more drastic. This potential point of difference is, however, contested. For example, Fletcher 
writes: 
 
“[E]pistemic error theory entails that no belief is… more justified than 
another…prudential error theory entails… no outcome is any better…for someone than 
another. Thus, it is as bad to be committed to [either].” (2017, 7) 
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But the entailment is contestable. The epistemic error theory would not merely commit us to 
unintuitive first-order epistemic judgments (though it would do this). It would potentially 
have far-reaching consequences elsewhere, including for the tenability of the sciences. More 
extreme consequences could include the inability to explain thought and action (if belief is 
constitutively normative), and perhaps even its own incoherence if, as has been argued, 
global scepticism would, if true, be incoherent or unstatable (Button 2013, Ch. 12). None of 
these consequences, nor analogues of them, would obviously follow from a prudential error 
theory. 
 
A similar point can be made with respect to companions in guilt arguments that take aesthetic 
judgment as a companion. Here too, even if aesthetic realists can make a plausible case that 
aesthetic judgment is no more dependent on our conative states than moral judgment 
(Hanson, forthcoming), the real challenge is to show that an aesthetic error theory is more 
implausible or costly than a moral error theory. Defenders of either prudential or aesthetic 
CIG arguments may respond to this challenge by denying its dialectical presupposition: CIG 
arguments needn’t have suasive force against moral error theorists in order to be sound. True. 
But their potential to do so is surely one of their primary sources of appeal and importance. 
 
5. Mathematics and Moral Epistemology 
 
The analogy between morality and mathematics in philosophy is a very old one. It is no less 
important in contemporary philosophy, and is often appealed to as part of CIG strategies that 
target moral scepticism.  
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Many contemporary metaethicists defend the view that moral facts are causally inefficacious 
with respect to the natural world (‘non-natural realism’). This is sometimes thought to lead to 
epistemological problems with respect to our moral beliefs, at the extreme meriting moral 
scepticism (Mackie 1977). The problem - in the first instance at least - is to explain how our 
moral beliefs could be reliable, given the lack of any causal connection between them and the 
facts to which they refer. If no explanation can be given, sceptical conclusions are sometimes 
drawn.xiv 
 
This problem is often claimed to have a mathematical analogue (Putnam 2002). Mathematical 
properties - standardly conceived - are also causally inefficacious with respect to the natural 
world. Indeed, the challenge to explain the reliability of our mathematical beliefs has been 
independently developed by Paul Benaceraff (1973) and Hartry Field (2005). As such, we 
might expect that the following is true: 
 
Mathematical Analogy: If moral non-naturalism entails moral scepticism, then, 
mathematical scepticism is true. 
 
If we add to this the prima facie reasonable assumption that mathematical scepticism is not 
true - that we do have some mathematical knowledge - the result is a CIG argument against 
moral scepticism. 
 
I will briefly discuss two ways in which this argument has been developed and challenged in 
the recent literature. 
 
5.1 Scanlon on Moral Epistemology 
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Scanlon takes the sceptical challenge for moral non-naturalists at face-value. He responds to 
it by providing an epistemology for morality: an explanation of how we ‘access’ the moral 
truths. It is explicitly modelled on mathematics. His proposal is that: 
 
“[W]e…discover normative truths and mathematical truths simply by thinking about 
these subjects in the right way.” (2014, 70, italics mine) 
 
In the case of mathematics, thinking about it in the right way is, Scanlon thinks, relatively 
unproblematic. He asks us to consider the axiom of pairing, according to which, if a and b are 
sets then there is a set c whose members are just a and b. This, is not, Scanlon claims, a 
conceptual truth, but it is nevertheless “obviously true.” (73). Scanlon’s thought is that this 
approach can be generalised to the moral domain. Here too, we arrive at knowledge by 
thinking about things in the right way, yielding obviously true conclusions. We might, for 
example, arrive at the conclusion that extreme pain is prima facie bad for its bearer. So the 
case for moral scepticism is defused via analogy with mathematical epistemology.  
 
One interesting challenge to this - amongst many - is whether moral propositions possess the 
‘obviousness’ that some mathematical propositions appear to. The axiom of pairing, for 
example, may be thought self-evident in a way that moral knowledge is not. This is arguably 
further supported by contrasting the widespread nature of moral disagreement with 
convergence in mathematics.  
 
This challenge has recently been explored, and rejected, by Justin Clarke-Doane (2014, 
2015b). Firstly, Clarke-Doane argues, axioms in foundational mathematics may not even be 
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comprehensible to non-experts, let alone self-evident. And amongst mathematical experts, 
they are the subject of disagreement. Secondly, whilst there may be some mathematical 
truths (typically theorems, not axioms) that are candidates for self-evidence, this is no less 
obvious in the moral domain: 
 
“I am not aware of any non error-theorist who rejects [1+1=2 or that 7 is prime]. But this 
fails to establish a disanalogy [with] morality. I am not aware of any non-error-theorist 
who rejects the claim that burning babies for fun is wrong, or that it is sometimes 
permissible for people to stand up.” (2014, 241) 
 
Clarke-Doane thereby provides some support for Scanlon-style defences of the Mathematical 
Analogy (whether or not he, or we, think that such defences are required to respond to the 
sceptical challenge). 
 
5.2 Street’s Debunking Argument 
 
Consider an alternative challenge to Mathematical Analogy. It is often thought that when we 
reflect on the causal origins of our moral beliefs we should see that: 
 
Moral Insensitivity: Even if the moral facts had been different, our moral beliefs would 
have remained the same. 
 
This point is well illustrated by Sharon Street’s discussion of the philosophical significance 
of the evolutionary origins of out basic moral sentiments (2006). We would have been 
disposed to think it good to, for example, care for our children whether it not it in fact was. 
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This is because of the selective advantage at which it stood us. As a result of the insensitive 
nature of our moral beliefs, a sceptical conclusion is drawn. 
 
By contrast, when we reflect on the causal origins of our mathematical beliefs we find 
something very different. Specifically, we find: 
 
Mathematical Sensitivity: If the mathematical facts had been different, our mathematical 
beliefs would have been different too. 
 
This point is often made by arguing that the selective advantage of mathematical beliefs 
depends on their being true (Joyce 2006, Sinnott-Armstrong 2006, Ruse 1986). The result is 
that Street’s version of the epistemological challenge for moral scepticism doesn’t appear to 
generalise to the mathematical domain. So Mathematical Analogy, and the CIG strategy, fail. 
 
Again, Clarke-Doane has defended the analogy (2012, 2014, 2015a). Moral beliefs aren’t 
insensitive after all. This is because of the modal profile of basic true moral propositions: 
they are necessarily true. It follows that there are no possible worlds in which they (i.e. the 
moral truths) vary, but our moral beliefs stay the same. So Moral Insensitivity is false. So this 
well-known challenge to Mathematical Analogy fails. 
 
But isn’t this just a trick? Even if the moral truths are metaphysically (and perhaos 
normatively) necessary, isn’t it still conceptually possible that they could have been 
different? Perhaps. But this may be equally true of our mathematical beliefs. In a classic CIG 
manoeuvre, Clarke-Doane writes: 
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“[W]e seem to be equally unable to show that [true] beliefs … are sensitive with respect 
to conceptually possible worlds. The mathematical case makes the point vividly. 
[V]irtually none of our [mathematical] beliefs is sensitive with respect to conceptually 
possible worlds.” (2015a, 90-91) 
 
As such, the conceptual possibility that our moral beliefs are insensitive could not entail 
moral scepticism without also entailing mathematical scepticism.  
 
Clearly, this is not the end of the story however. Even if we concede to Clarke-Doane that 
moral and mathematical beliefs respectively fare equally well with respect to sensitivity, we 
might try to re-cast Street-Style challenges: sensitivity is, after all, not necessary and 
sufficient for reliability. Hence, we are not yet entitled to either Mathematical Analogy or to a 
rebuttal of traditional arguments for moral scepticism. In fairness to Clarke-Doane, he does 
not claim otherwise. Moral and mathematical beliefs are, he claims, equally good 
companions with respect to ‘safety’ (‘could our beliefs easily have been false?’) too. If this is 
correct, then Mathematical Analogy will succeed unless it can be shown that the moral 
reliability requires more than a safe and sensitive modal profile (see Woods, forthcoming).  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this brief article I have surveyed some of the wide range of CIG arguments in the current 
literature. There are many more arguments that I have not discussed including those that take 
religion, the law and even philosophy itself as companions (Shafer-Landau, 2006). Doubtless, 
some of the CIG arguments in this range will be successful: they will show that at least some 
metaethical arguments over-reach. Often, however, attempts at showing this have proved to 
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be at least as complex and controversial as the premises of the metaethical arguments against 
which they are targeted. As such, it is questionable whether, in general, the CIG strategy 
really does provide a better basis for rejecting arguments for moral scepticism or moral error 
theory than would be provided by directly challenging the premises of those arguments 
themselves. xv  
 
 
																																																						
i Or, alternatively, that ordinary speech acts presuppose that there are moral facts (Cuneo, 
2014). 
ii This is the case with, for example, Cuneo’s (2007) argument in The Normative Web. I will – 
in section 2 - focus on the analogical aspect of the argument. 
iii See, for example, Lenman (2008), Fletcher (2009, 2017), Heathwood (2009), Cowie (2014, 
2016), Rowland (2013, 2016), Das (2016, 2017), Kyriacou and Cuneo (forthcoming). 
iv This kind of justification of the supposed irreducible normativity of the moral is to the fore 
in Olson (2014). 
v For a detailed discussion and defence see Hazlett (2013). 
vi See also Lenman (2008). 
vii For useful discussion of this point see the interchange between Thomas Kelly (2007) and 
Adam Leite (2007). 
viii This is close to Heathwood’s own (2009) formulation. 
ix My arguments loosely follow those in Cuneo and Kyriacou (forthcoming). 
x This is actually contestable. It may be that knowledge itself is not an essentially normative 
property. There has been some interesting recent work on this. See Kurt Sylvan’s helpful 
(2017) summary and argument. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing my 
attention to this. 
xi For discussion of Shah’s (2003) argument see McHugh (2013). For discussion of the above 
as applied to Moore-paradoxical sentences see Greenberg and Cowie (forthcoming). 
xii A full discussion of all of these issues is in Cowie (ms.) 
xiii For relevant discussion of desire-satisfaction views see Heathwood (2011, 2016). 
xiv For a response see Enoch (2011, Ch. 7). 
xv I am grateful to editors and anonymous reviewers at Philosophy Compass for their helpful 
and constructive comments. 
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